Summary. Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated in recent times: it has been shown that strategies surviving m + 1 rounds of iterated admissibility may be identified as those that are obtained under a condition called rationality and m assumption of rationality (RmAR) in complete lexicographic type structures. On the other hand, it has been shown that its limit condition, R∞AR, might not be satisfied by any state in the epistemic structure, if the class of types is complete and the types are continuous. In this paper we introduce a weaker notion of completeness which is nonetheless sufficient to characterize IA in a highly general way as the class of strategies that indeed satisfy R∞AR. The key methodological innovation involves defining a new notion of generic types and employing these in conjunction with Cohen's technique of forcing.
Introduction
The epistemic analysis of game solutions has focused on the belief and knowledge requirements for their existence. Well-known solution concepts are evaluated in terms of how demanding those requirements are. One of the less demanding solutions is based on the idea that rational players will never choose weakly dominated (inadmissible) actions [17] . Furthermore, the ideal of a strategically stable equilibrium can be achieved through the iterated elimination of inadmissible strategies [16] . Profiles that capture this intuition are composed by actions that survive the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies at successive levels. Strategies that meet this condition are known as iterated admissible (IA) strategies.
The epistemic characterization of IA has been actively investigated in recent times, because of the challenges that it poses. On one hand, the elimination of a weakly dominated strategy at a given round of deletion requires the assumption that strategies deleted in previous rounds will not be used. Yet on the other, the definition of admissibility indicates that at whatever relevant level of iteration some probability distribution exists in the context of which a certain admissible strategy registers as a best response relative to all other possibilities. The conceptual support for this notion thus entails the potential inclusion of all the strategies of the other players. Therefore, none can be discarded.
This inclusion-exclusion problem has been formally disposed by resorting to Lexicographic Probability Systems [7] . A key result in this approach is that strategies that survive m + 1 rounds of iterated admissibility can be obtained if players satisfy the epistemic condition known as rationality and m assumption of rationality (RmAR) in complete type structures [7] . In other words, intuitively, if there are "enough" types in a given model then a movement preserving admissible solutions from level m to level m + 1 is always possible in that model under the RmAR condition. This would seem to suggest that the limit case at infinity would also provide a solution (in a precise sense that we clarify below), but it has been shown that this is not the case, that is, R∞AR might not be satisfied by any state in the epistemic structure, if the types are continuous and the class of types is complete. Nonetheless, if continuity is not required [15] or completeness is not demanded [18] it can be proven that a profile of strategies does indeed satisfy R∞AR if and only if it satisfies IA.
In this paper we investigate issues corresponding to the above in Qualitative Type Spaces [17] . Within this latter framework, it has in fact been shown that the construction of a complete type structure [6] is impossible. Our strategy is -despite the impossibility of constructing a complete type structureto make use in this framework of the natural order relations emerging from the hierarchy of iterated levels in order to generate a "new kind" of type, called generic, which, when adjoined to the initial model, will be sufficient to broaden it and thereby to guarantee that R∞AR is satisfied within it by a straightforward application of Cohen's technique of forcing. This, in conjunction with the result indicated above, will in turn entail that IA is also satisfied in the enlarged (although not complete) model.
The mathematical tool of forcing was originally introduced by Paul Cohen in order to show that Georg Cantor's famous Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of Zermelo-Frenkel Set Theory [10] [14] . Since then, forcing has been mostly relegated to the realm of the foundations of Mathematics; its use remains uncommon in applied fields. Philosophically, this may be understood as a consequence of Shoenfield's Theorem, which entails that forcing yields results only in the non-absolute fragment of Mathematics, while most of applied science would seem to be confined in the absolute realm [12] . In this work, however, we show that forcing can indeed be used in the present case to provide definite features to the types associated to IA strategy profiles. This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce the notion of IA solution while in section 3 we present a possibility-based epistemic model of games and strategies. In section 4 a brief conceptual discussion of Cohen's method of forcing is given. In section 5 we then use forcing to address the problem of defining generic types in strategic belief models. Finally, in section 6 we show how these types ensure that R∞AR is equivalent (in terms of strategies) to IA in this new context.
Iterated Admissibility
The strategic interaction among self-interested parties can be represented as a strategic form game: Definition 1.2.1 Let G = I, {S i } i∈I , {π i } i∈I be a game, where I = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and S i , i ∈ I is a finite set of strategies for each player. A profile of strategies, s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is an element of S = i∈I S i . In turn, Π i : S → R is player i's payoff.
The goal is to assess the solutions of the game, i.e. the family of profiles S ⊆ S that might be expected to be chosen by the players. These profiles capture the rationality of players, seeking to maximize their payoffs. Being Π i (s) dependent on the choice of i, s i as well as of the choices of the rest of the players (denoted s −i ∈ j =i S j ), a profile (s i , s −i ) ∈ S shows also the coordination among agents that ensures this outcome.
One of the many possible solution notions stems from a basic postulate of decision theory, namely that no player will choose a weakly dominated (inadmissible) strategy. That is, if for s i ∈ S i there exists σ * i ∈ ∆S i (i.e. a probability distribution over The interest in S IA resides in its naturality and in the achievement of strategic stability it ensures [16] . In turn, it raises the question of the aspects that contribute to the coordination on S IA , which is implicit since no communication is allowed among the players. In particular, we might inquire into those aspects of an epistemic nature, that is, those ensuing from the beliefs and knowledge of the individual players.
Strategic Belief Model of a Game
We now show how these notions apply within Qualitative Type Spaces, which allow us to characterize certain strategic aspects of games. In particular, we define the notion of Strategic Belief Model, which captures the epistemic aspects involved in any choice of strategies [6] :
where for each i ∈ I, S i and T i are i's sets of strategies and types, respectively. The structure intends to model a game G and each strategy-type pair is a state for a player, and each type of a player has beliefs about the states of the other players. These beliefs are captured by the relations P i that satisfy:
That is, P i [t i ] captures the strategies and types of the other players that i thinks are possible.
The analysis of the rationality of players and the epistemic conditions of solutions to the game can be fully disclosed up from the states of the game, i.e. profiles of states of the players.
M has interesting features. The first one is that each t i can be "unfolded" in terms of the types of the other players, which in turn leads to beliefs about the type of i, etc.
To make this notion more precise, let us define for any t i of i, the unfolding of t i :
•
This means that, if t j ∈ P m i [t i ], t j can be unfolded in m steps to t i , i.e. t j is believed by t i by considering m steps of belief.
Another important feature of M is that it provides a powerful framework for describing the epistemic aspects involved in a game [1] . The fundamental concept here is that of assumption defined over events of M, i.e. on sets of states of the game. For any E ⊆ i (S i × T i ), the types of i that assume E are denoted as AS i [E] with:
In particular, we say that at t i , i assumes that j = i is rational if t i ∈ AS i [j is rational], where the event "j is rational" is
Then, we can define the condition denoted RmAR (for Rationality and m-Assumption of Rationality):
Then, finally, we can define condition R∞AR as that satisfied by all the states in
in which players are rational, assume the rationality of the others, assume that the others assume their own rationality, etc.
R∞AR and IA
It is quite natural to think that R∞AR is an epistemic condition that supports S IA . Indeed, this relation can be strengthened to make them equivalent, but this identification hinges on the properties of the space of types. More particularly it relies on its richness, since there have to be "enough" types to complement the strategies that survived the IA process and make them states in R∞AR.
Among the conditions that ensure the richness of the type space is completeness, i.e. that for each player i and every E ⊆ S −i × T −i there exists a type of i, say t i such that P i [t i ] = E. But as shown in [6] , a strategic belief model cannot in fact satisfy this condition. That is, there necessarily exist events that cannot be assumed by the players.
A weaker condition but one still strong enough may be provided as follows: given a strategy s * i ∈ S i , admissible with respect
and any s i ∈S i . If this condition is satisfied by M for any i and everȳ S i ×S −i ⊆ S i × S −i , M may be said to be rationality-complete.
We then have the following result:
If M is rationality-complete and
for every i.
Proof: We will show that for any i, if R
. We will proceed by induction over m: • Suppose the claim is true for m = k. Let us see that it is also true for
there exists t i such that (s i , t i ) is rational. Suppose s i is not admissible with respect to
S i × S −i . Then there existsŝ i ∈ S i such that Π i (ŝ i , s −i ) ≥ Π i (s i , s −i ) for some s −i ∈ P i [t i ] |S−i . But this contradicts that (s i , t i ) is rational. Thus, R 0 i|Si ⊆ S 1 i . Conversely, if s i ∈ S 1 i ,
by rationality-completeness we have that, since s i is admissible with respect to
. 
and anyŝ i ∈ S 
Forcing in a Nutshell
There are certain interesting properties that a particular M might exhibit. In particular, given the above result, we may be interested in the conditions that ensure that
Here is where the technique of forcing can be applied. To describe what forcing is we draw heavily from [9] , based in turn on the original work of Paul Cohen [10] . See also [4] , [3] , [8] , [12] , [13] and [14] , as well as the intriguing application in [11] .
Given a set-theoretic model M of an axiomatically described system, we can define an extension of such a model by adjoining a set G to M , and denoting the new model by M [G]. The nature of set G, which we will call a generic set is such that, even being definable from within M , it is indiscernable from M . By this we mean that the language within M allows us only to name the elements of G, but not explicitly to describe their construction. In this way, we do not have access to the inner structure of G, which remains unknowable from the point of view of M -hence the use of the word generic (as referring to the expression of something so "mixed up" or "common" that it cannot be discerned). Once the generic G has been defined, the extension via G of the ground model M allows for new and possibly surprising ways to satisfy the ground axioms, with profound epistemic consequences. Indeed, although truths in M [G] are not directly accessible, we can define what we call a forcing relation between objects and relations at the level of the ground model. If one object forces a certain relation on M , then, if that relation belongs to G (and we might never be able to know that except as a modal claim across possible models), then we obtain "truth" in M [G] .
In what follows, we apply these methodological notions in order to extend strategic belief models as defined above, thereby making possible the forcing of a desirable epistemic property like R∞AR and indirectly the solution concept S IA for any finite game G.
Generic Types
Let us start with a given M 0 intended as a family of events of the game along with their underlying states of the game. This then constitutes our ground model, on which a M with desired properties will subsequently be built. We proceed by defining a family of forcing conditions, P with a partial order defined as follows:
• P= {φ = (s 1 , t 1 ) , . . . , (s n , t n ) : every i is rational and there exists a natural number m(φ) such that for any i, j, t j ∈ P m(φ) i
• For any φ, φ ′ ∈ P, each one defined by a natural number (m(φ) and m(φ
We say that if φ ′ φ, then φ dominates φ ′ . We then define the set of correct conditions, δ, which satisfies the conditions of a filter in (P, ):
Our candidate is δ = {γ = (s 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (s n , t n ) : there exists a natural number m(γ) such that for any i,
}. We then have that: Proposition 1.6.1 δ is a correct set in P.
Proof: Let us see first that δ ⊆ P. That is, that for every γ ∈ δ there exists φ ∈ P such that γ = φ. We know that γ= (s 1 , t 1 ) , . . . , (s n , t n ) where for some m ≥ 0 every i is such that, (s i , t i ) ∈ R m i . From this condition it follows that each i is rational. We have now to show that for every i, j,
The converse is also true: given a state (s 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (s n , t n ) ∈ P, it follows that there exists m such that each
Contradiction. From this last implication it follows that if φ
′ ∈ δ and φ ′ φ then φ ∈ δ. This is because m(φ ′ ) ≤ m(φ) and φ is such that every i is rational and for
, which in turn implies that every
and therefore, φ ∈ δ. Finally, given φ ′ , φ ′′ ∈ δ, just take m as the maximum of m(φ ′ ) and m(φ ′′ ).
Without loss of generality let us assume that m = m(φ ′ ). Then, we take φ = φ We can now define a class of conditions called a domination, D ⊆ P (a dense set):
We say that a correct set G is generic if G ⊆ δ and G ∩ D = ∅ for any domination D. We then have that:
Theorem 2. G = {γ ∈ δ : γ = (s 1 , t 1 ) , . . . , (s n , t n ) with for every m and every i, (s i , t i ) ∈ R m i } is a generic set.
Proof: By Proposition 1.6.1, δ is a correct set and so is G ⊂ δ. To see that it is generic, just consider any φ ∈ P, which is identified by a finite natural number m(φ). Then, by definition, γ ∈ G is such that for every i, (s i , t i ) ∈ R m i for every m, in particular with m ≥ m(φ). Then, φ γ.
In the context of the previous discussion, we can say that G defines a set of types {t * i } i∈I such that each one, joint with the corresponding s * i , satisfies the condition that (s * i , t * i ) ∈ R m i for every m ≥ 0. That is, each i is, with her type and the correponding strategy, rational and assumes rationality at all levels. In other words, it satifies R∞AR. In accordance with Cohen's technique, these generic types cannot be defined in the language of M 0 . That is, there is no property λ expressible in M 0 such that:
This realization is quite important since, as shown in [6] , M 0 is not definable complete, i.e. there exists some event E ∈ M 0 , definable by a property λ E (i.e. (s 1 , t 1 ) , . . . , (s n , t n ) ∈ E ⇔ λ E ( (s 1 , t 1 ) , . . . , (s n , t n ) )) such that there exists a i for whom no t i ∈ T i satisfies P i [t i ] = E | j =i (Sj ×Tj ) .
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But forcing shows that M 0 can be extended to M 0 [G], to which the object constructed by G, i.e. the class of generic types, belongs. To define M 0 [G], we will consider the names of objects in G. The G-names are recursively defined sets of the form {(µ, γ) : µ is a G − name and γ ∈ G}. These can be ordered in terms of their rank, where a name µ of rank 0 is the set of pairs (∅, γ) with m(γ) = 0 and, recursively, we say that µ is of rank m if it includes all the pairs (µ ′ , γ) such that m(γ) = m and the rank of µ ′ , m ′ , verifies m ′ < m. The referential value of a name µ, r G (µ) is then also defined recursively:
It is easy to see that names of rank 0 yield all the states in which all players are rational, while for any m > 0 the names have as referential values all the states in which the players are rational and assume up to level m the rationality of the others.
Then, M 0 [G] = {r G (µ) : µ is a name in M 0 }. We have:
Proof: Trivial. Just take any name µ such that for every γ ∈ G, (∅, γ) / ∈ µ. It is easy to find an event in M 0 satisfying this condition: take anyone in which the states are such that there exist i and j, with (s i , t i ) ∈ R mi i and (s j , t j ) ∈ R mj j and m i = m j .
While G is not an element of M 0 , our recursive method has guaranteed that it exists in M 0 [G] as "namable" although not strictly constructible. This object represents the class of states in which each (s i , t i ; s −i , t −i ) ∈ R∞AR. If we take the statement Ψ ( (s 1 , t 1 ) , . . . , (s n , t n ) ) which is true iff each (s i , t i ; s −i , t −i ) ∈ R∞AR, we know that: ( (s 1 , t 1 ) , . . . , (s n , t n ) ) and by the central result in forcing 6 , if µ is a name in M 0 such that (s 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (s n , t n ) ∈ r G (µ) we have that γ ∈ G is such that:
i.e. the generic types force R∞AR even though the space of types involved is not strictly complete.
We are now able to present the main result of the application of forcing to strategic belief models by bringing the discussion immediately above into conjunction with the earlier theorem concerning rationality-completeness: In this sense, we have defined a class of types involved in the characterization of S IA over any G with arbitrary (finite) numbers of players and actions. In other words, given the result above and our application of forcing to the space of types via generic types, we are able to ensure the sufficiency of rationality-completeness for the characterization of IA for a very general class of games.
